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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to bring the resources of virtue epistemology to bear on the issue of the
epistemic objectivity of science. A distinction is made between theoretical virtues, which may be
possessed by scientific theories, and epistemic virtues, which may be exercised by individual scien-
tists. A distinction is then made between ontological objectivity, objectivity of truth, and epistemic
objectivity, the last being the principal focus of the paper. It is then noted that a role must be
played by deliberative judgement in determining how to apply the theoretical virtues. It is suggested
that such judgement may be virtuous in light of the exercise of the epistemic virtues. It is argued
that the primary location of epistemic objectivity is the theoretical virtues, whereas the epistemic
virtues of scientists play a subordinate role.
Keywords: objectivity, theoretical virtue, empirical virtue, virtue epistemology
Recent work on the theoretical and epistemic virtues is of relevance to the
nature of objectivity. A scientist who accepts a theory that satisfies appropriate
theoretical virtues has an objective basis for acceptance of the theory. The
objective basis of the scientist’s theory acceptance may be further enhanced if
it arises from the exercise of appropriate epistemic virtues on the part of the
scientist. But what is the relationship between the theoretical virtues pos-
sessed by the theory and the epistemic virtues exercised by the scientist? And
how exactly does either kind of virtue give rise to objectivity?
In this paper, my aim is to bring the recent discussion of theoretical and
epistemic virtues to bear on the issue of objectivity. On my view, the primary
basis of epistemic objectivity is the theoretical virtues that inform scientists’
choice of theory. Provided that the theoretical virtues satisfied by a theory are
in fact genuinely truth-conducive norms of inquiry, acceptance by a scientist
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of that theory has an objective basis. There is, however, a plurality of theoretical
virtues. Scientists must therefore employ their capacity for deliberative judge-
ment in determining the relevance and comparative significance of applicable
theoretical virtues. In the course of such deliberative judgement, a scientist may
exercise a range of epistemic virtues. The question that I wish to pursue in
this paper is that of the relationship between the epistemic virtues exercised
in scientific judgement and the objectivity provided by the theoretical virtues.
In outline, the structure of the paper is as follows. In section 1, I discuss
the nature and role of the theoretical virtues. In section 2, I draw on recent
discussion of Pierre Duhem to characterize the epistemic virtues, and then
briefly contrast two major approaches within virtue epistemology. In section
3, I distinguish epistemic objectivity from ontological objectivity and the ob-
jectivity of truth, and sketch my preferred account of epistemic objectivity. In
section 4, I describe the role played by deliberative judgement due to the
multiplicity of theoretical virtues and the possible underdetermination of
theory by data. In section 5, I suggest that, to reduce the risk of subjective
factors affecting theory-choice, the epistemic virtues may provide constraint
on scientific judgement. In section 6, I argue that the role played by the epi-
stemic virtues with respect to objectivity is secondary to that played by the
theoretical virtues. I conclude by summarizing the discussion and raising
questions to be pursued in further development of the present approach.
1. THEORETICAL VIRTUES
Theoretical virtues are virtues of theories. They are properties that a theory
may possess in terms of which the theory may be evaluated. A good theory is
one that satisfies theoretical virtues. A bad theory is one that fails to satisfy
the virtues. A number of different theoretical virtues have been identified.
Some virtues are primarily empirical, such as fit with available data, predic-
tive accuracy, and explanatory power or breadth. Some are more formal, such
as simplicity, coherence, or internal consistency. Others, such as beauty and
elegance, seem to reflect aesthetic considerations. Still others, such as practical
control and social utility, seem to be broadly pragmatic factors.
The expression “theoretical virtue” is not the only form of words that has
been employed to refer to such normative criteria. They are also referred to,
inter alia, as criteria of theory-choice, scientific values, and methodological
rules or standards. As our focus here is on the virtues that play a role in the
evaluation of theories, I will tend to speak of theoretical virtues, though
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another form of words will on occasion be employed where appropriate. My
focus on the theoretical virtues should not be taken to suggest that the use of
normative criteria in science is restricted to criteria that are employed in the
evaluation of theories. Normative criteria are employed at all levels of scientific
activity. Principles of experimental design are employed in planning experi-
ments as well as in determining the number and variety of experiments that
are to be undertaken. Procedural rules govern the proper use of instrumenta-
tion in laboratory and field settings. Due to the idiosyncrasies of particular
items of equipment and circumstances of use, there may even be norms of
practice that apply to specific items of equipment in specific laboratory or
field settings. Moreover, some of the norms employed in science may be tacit
rather than explicitly formulated. But, for present purposes, we will focus on
the theoretical virtues that form the basis of scientific theory-appraisal.
The theoretical virtues pick out a number of different properties of theories.
This has led philosophers to distinguish between different kinds of theoreti-
cal virtues. Apart from empirical virtues such as empirical fit and explanatory
power, Ernan McMullin (2008: 501-505) distinguishes “internal virtues”
such as internal consistency and simplicity, “contextual virtues” such as con-
sonance with theories in surrounding fields, and “diachronic virtues” such as
fertility and unification. Heather Douglas (2013: 799-800) distinguishes be-
tween minimal criteria and ideal desiderata, as well as criteria or desiderata
which apply either to a theory by itself in isolation from evidence or to a theory
in relation to evidence. Consistency is a minimal criterion, which applies to a
theory by itself. Empirical adequacy with respect to existing — as opposed to
all possible — data is a minimal criterion that applies to a theory in relation to
evidence. Simplicity is a desideratum that applies to a theory on its own.
Unification is a desideratum that applies to a theory in relation to evidence.
Approaching the issue in strictly empiricist terms, Bas van Fraassen (1980:
88) distinguishes empirical virtues from pragmatic virtues, which he takes to
serve no epistemic role. For his part, Larry Laudan (2004) distinguishes strictly
epistemic virtues relating to truth from cognitive virtues such as breadth,
scope, and unification.
For our present purposes, it suffices to work with a broad distinction
between virtues that are primarily empirical, such as empirical fit and ex-
planatory power, and virtues that are less empirical, such as simplicity and
unification. I will sometimes refer to the former as empirical virtues and the
latter as non-empirical virtues, though it must be understood that the dis-
tinction between empirical and non-empirical virtues is not a sharp one.
It is widely accepted that there are multiple theoretical virtues. This raises
the question of the relationship between the virtues. Science is a largely em-
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pirical endeavour. To the extent that this is the case, the more empirical virtues
such as empirical fit take precedence over less empirical virtues such as sim-
plicity. But observation is fallible, and more than one theory may fit the known
facts. The empirical virtues are therefore not sacrosanct. They may require
supplementation by non-empirical considerations. In some cases, they may
even need to be over-ridden by non-empirical considerations. But, while the
need to grant priority to empirical considerations is widely recognized, it
seems also to be widely acknowledged that the theoretical virtues are not
regimented into a fixed hierarchical structure. There is no universally agreed
or accepted system of ranking which organizes the virtues into a fixed order
of precedence.1
Because the theoretical virtues do not fall into an established or agreed
rank ordering, scientists must determine which theoretical virtues are the
most important or relevant in any particular case. This requires that an act or
process of deliberative judgement be undertaken on the part of scientists.
Insofar as scientists must exercise their own individual judgement in ranking
and applying the virtues, it may seem inevitable that subjective elements enter
into the scientific decision-making process. But this is not necessarily the case.
The epistemic virtues of individual scientists that are activated in the de-
cision-making process may inject an added element of objectivity into the
decision. Or, at least, that is what I wish to suggest in this paper. Let us now
turn to the topic of epistemic virtue.2
2. EPISTEMIC VIRTUE
As we saw in the previous section, the theoretical virtues are virtues of
theories. They are properties that theories possess. By contrast, the epistemic
virtues are properties of individual human subjects. Of particular relevance
                                                   
1 Douglas’s (2013) distinction between minimal criteria and ideal desiderata has the
effect of separating the virtues into those that a theory must minimally satisfy and others
that a theory ideally would satisfy. This does introduce some regimentation into the virtues.
While this significantly reduces the potential for conflict between the virtues, it does not
provide an exhaustive rank ordering of them.
2 I write here of the judgement of an individual scientist rather than the judgment of
a group of scientists or the scientific community. The possibility of group-based scientific
decision-making raises additional issues of relevance to the objectivity of science. But my
focus for present purposes is on the relationship between the theoretical virtues and the
epistemic virtues of individual scientists. I set the issue of collective or group-based deci-
sion-making to one side for the purposes of the present discussion.
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here, they are properties possessed by individual scientists. The epistemic
virtues include properties such as intellectual humility and honesty, even-
handedness and open-mindedness. The epistemic virtues are properties, ca-
pacities, or skills of a cognitive or intellectual nature that an individual scientist
may possess and which they may exercise in the course of deliberative
judgement and decision-making.3
According to virtue epistemology, the epistemic virtues play a pivotal role
in epistemic justification and knowledge. In recent years, virtue epistemology
has been brought into dialogue with the philosophy of science in connection
with the work of Pierre Duhem. David Stump (2007) suggests that light may
be shed on Duhem’s notion of good sense by analyzing it in virtue-theoretic
terms. For Duhem, scientists employ the faculty of good sense to choose be-
tween theories even though the empirical evidence may not conclusively
favour one theory over the other. Indeed, as Milena Ivanova (2010: 60) notes,
appeal to additional non-empirical criteria (e.g., scope, number of hypotheses,
novelty of prediction) need not uniquely determine the choice between em-
pirically equivalent theories. As a result, scientists must be guided by good
sense in making a decision that is dictated neither by empirical data nor by
non-empirical criteria.
Stump points out that Duhem’s idea of good sense has both moral and
intellectual elements. A scientist who exercises good sense in choosing be-
tween theories is like a fair and impartial judge who arrives at a legal decision
in a balanced and unbiased manner. The exercise of good sense is not a mat-
ter of applying or following a set of clear-cut methodological rules that dictate
a unique outcome. Rather, good sense is employed to make a decision whose
outcome is not — and is unable to be — determined by rules of method. On
Stump’s analysis, the scientist’s exercise of good sense exemplifies such vir-
tues as fairness and impartiality. These virtues have both a moral and an in-
tellectual dimension. Scientific good sense is not, therefore, a simple faculty.
It is one that involves the use and display of a range of virtues that promote
sound judgement.
It is customary to distinguish between two broad forms of virtue episte-
mology (Axtell 1997). On the one hand, the virtue-reliabilist takes there to be
cognitive competences whose use reliably leads to truth. On the other hand,
the virtue-responsibilist takes there to be character traits constitutive of vir-
                                                   
3 As with the term “theoretical virtue,” there is some variation in usage with respect to
the epistemic virtues. Indeed, some authors use the term “epistemic virtue” to refer to the
theoretical virtues, especially in the context of realism (e.g., Tulodziecki 2014). What I refer
to by the expression “epistemic virtue” are the intellectual or cognitive virtues of individual
scientists.
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tuous epistemic character. Virtue-reliabilists tend to focus on inbuilt capaci-
ties such as perception or memory. Virtue-responsibilists tend to focus on
traits such as humility or open-mindedness, which may be acquired and cul-
tivated. Virtue-reliabilism reflects the externalist tendency of earlier forms of
reliabilism, whereas virtue-responsibilism aligns more closely with an inter-
nalist view of justification. The contrast between reliabilist and responsibilist
forms of virtue epistemology can be made intuitively clear. But there is room
to doubt that the distinction may be sustained. A fully developed virtue epis-
temology may require both inbuilt competences and acquired character
traits. For our purposes, however, it is not necessary to take a stand on this.
Our purpose here is simply to explore the extent to which epistemic virtues
may be of assistance with respect to the nature of objectivity.4
3. EPISTEMIC OBJECTIVITY
The notion of objectivity is widely recognized to be ambiguous (e.g.,
Douglas 2004). It is useful to distinguish between three basic forms of objec-
tivity. The first form of objectivity is an ontological form of objectivity. There
is an objective reality that exists in its own right. The way that objective reality
is does not depend on human mental activity such as belief, experience, or
language use. The second form of objectivity relates to truth. Truth is objec-
tive in the sense that it does not depend on what we believe. It depends on the
way things stand in objective reality rather than the way we think that reality is.
The third form is epistemic objectivity. In relation to science, this form of
objectivity is connected with the idea of a scientific method. Use of the method
(or methods) of science excludes subjective factors in favour of epistemic con-
siderations. The relationship between the three forms of objectivity is broadly
this: objective truths are made true by the way reality objectively is and use of
objective methods leads to discovery of objective truth about objective reality.
                                                   
4 It is worth noting, however, that the distinction between virtue-reliabilism and vir-
tue-responsibilism may be of relevance to the virtue-theoretic interpretation of Duhem.
Ivanova (2010) argues that Stump’s virtue-theoretic interpretation of Duhem is unsuc-
cessful insofar as it fails to come to grips with Duhem’s anti-realist conception of the aim of
science. In his criticism of Ivanova, Kidd (2011) argues that Ivanova fails to take into account
the contrast between virtue-reliabilism and virtue-responsibilism, and that Duhem is more
appropriately seen in virtue-responsibilist rather than virtue-reliabilist terms. In her re-
sponse, Ivanova (2011) raises concerns with respect to the case that Kidd makes for the
virtue-responsibilist reading of Duhem.
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In this paper, the form of objectivity of principal interest is epistemic ob-
jectivity. As indicated, this form of objectivity is intimately related to the idea
of a scientific method. On a traditional approach to the philosophy of science,
science is characterized by the use of a special method, which provides a basis
for the demarcation between science and non-science. Use of the method by
scientists eliminates the influence of subjective factors such as bias, personal
interest, or political orientation from the outputs of science. The method en-
sures that the only considerations taken into account in scientific inquiry are
epistemically relevant factors such as empirical evidence, which contribute to
the advance of scientific knowledge. Because of the objective nature of scien-
tific inquiry, science is characterized by widespread consensus. Occasional
disagreement among scientists is resolved by means of the shared method. It
is precisely because of the objectivity of the methods of science that scientific
inquiry generates agreement amongst a range of practitioners. By adopting
objective methods that remove subjective elements, science not only pro-
motes knowledge but also ensures consensus.
On a traditional approach to the philosophy of science, science is charac-
terized by a unique method shared throughout the sciences and the history of
science. However, since the “historical turn” in the philosophy of science the
idea of a single invariant method has fallen out of favour.5 On a more con-
temporary approach, the methodology of science consists of a range of meth-
odological norms and procedures, which is subject to variation between the
sciences and across the history of science. In this context, the theoretical vir-
tues discussed in section 1 are to be thought of as methodological norms em-
ployed in the evaluation of scientific theories. The theoretical virtues do not
exhaust the methodology of science. For, in addition to theory development
and appraisal, science involves a range of laboratory-based activities relating
to experiment, as well as fieldwork, among other activities. Nor need the set
of theoretical virtues be entirely fixed, since some allowance may be made for
variation between sciences and across the history of science.
I have elsewhere distinguished between a minimal and a robust sense of
epistemic objectivity (Sankey, forthcoming).6 In the minimal sense of objec-
tivity, the methodological norms of science, such as the theoretical virtues,
have an independence from individual scientists. The theoretical virtues lie
                                                   
5 By the “historical turn,” I refer to the shift that took place in the 1960s following the
work of such authors as Thomas S. Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend to a more historically in-
formed and less methodologically orientated approach to the philosophy of science.
6 I introduce the distinction in connection with Kuhn’s account of the scientific values
that form the shared basis of theory-choice. Kuhn’s values provide a minimal rather than a
robust sense of objectivity because no epistemological grounding is provided for the values.
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outside the mind of the individual scientist. They reflect features of theories
that theories possess that are independent of the scientist. Because the vir-
tues are independent, and reflect real features of theories, there is a sense in
which the virtues are objective. Because of their independence, they may play
a neutral role in theory-appraisal. But this is a minimal sense of objectivity.
Nothing has been said to show that there is a substantive connection of the
virtues with truth, or, indeed, with epistemic justification. Without an epis-
temological grounding for the virtues that explains their relation to truth, the
objectivity provided by the virtues is a minimal sense of objectivity. Indeed,
with no substantive connection made between the virtues, truth, and justifi-
cation, it barely qualifies as an epistemic sense of objectivity.
By contrast with the minimal sense, the robust sense of epistemic objec-
tivity requires more than the mere independence of theoretical virtues. At the
very least, an account must be provided of the epistemic role played by the
virtues with regard to justification and truth. It is not enough that the virtues
lie outside the mind of the scientist or that they are able to play a neutral role
due to their independence. To be able to play a genuinely epistemic role, use
of a theoretical virtue must lead to or, at least, toward the truth. A substantive
account must be able to be provided of the epistemic role of the virtue that
shows how its use gives rise to justification that is genuinely epistemic in na-
ture. Briefly, nothing short of an epistemological grounding of the virtues in
relation to truth is required for them to be able to provide epistemic objectiv-
ity in a robust sense.
My own preferred account of the connection between the virtues and
truth is a form of reliabilist epistemology. It is a modified version of Laudan’s
normative naturalist metamethodology, which places the normative naturalist
metamethodology in a scientific realist framework. Combining normative
naturalism with the realist idea that truth is an aim of science that may be
rationally pursued transforms it into a form of reliabilism. In particular, it
becomes a form of method reliabilism on which the theoretical virtues are
conceived as reliable means of arriving at the realist aim of truth. The virtues
are understood instrumentally, as tools of inquiry. As such, they are means
for the pursuit of epistemic ends. The relation between epistemic means and
ends is not a conceptual one investigated by a priori means but a contingent
one, open to empirical investigation. This way of thinking of the theoretical
virtues enables us to understand the question of whether a theoretical virtue
is warranted as the empirical question of whether use of the virtue does in
fact lead to truth. If, as a matter of empirical fact, use of a theoretical virtue
does lead to truth, then acceptance of a theory that satisfies the virtue has
objective epistemic warrant. It is not of course possible to immediately detect
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that use of a theoretical virtue leads to truth at the theoretical level. So I
employ a metamethodological version of the realist’s success argument to argue
that the best explanation of the use of the theoretical virtues in producing
successful scientific theories is that the virtues are in fact reliable truth-
conducive tools of inquiry.7
On this account, the objectivity provided by the theoretical virtues is not
just minimal objectivity due to the independence and neutrality of the vir-
tues. The objectivity provided by theoretical virtues, given that they are reli-
able tools of inquiry, is a robust form of objectivity. It is based on the fact that
use of the theoretical virtues has a substantive bearing on truth. The theoretical
virtues are, as a matter of empirical fact, truth-conducive. So the epistemic
warrant that derives from the virtues has an objective basis in reality. It is an
objective matter of fact that use of the virtues promotes truth.
4. A ROLE FOR DELIBERATIVE JUDGEMENT
The issue that I wish to discuss in this section arises because of the appar-
ent existence of a plurality of theoretical virtues. The issue may also be
framed in terms of the underdetermination of theory by data. I prefer the first
way of setting the topic up because it involves fewer assumptions. However,
I will canvas both ways of presenting the topic, starting with the former.
As we have seen, it is widely assumed that there are multiple theoretical
virtues. Moreover, there is no established ranking of the virtues that assigns
them an order of precedence. It is entirely possible that a single theory may
unequivocally exemplify all relevant virtues to a significantly greater extent
than all competing theories. Where this occurs, the virtues uniquely identify
that theory as the best among the competing theories. However, as was
famously pointed out by Kuhn (1977), different theories may exemplify dif-
ferent virtues. A theory may be more empirically accurate than a simpler or
more coherent competitor. A theory may explain a broad range of disparate
phenomena while a rival theory makes more precise predictions, or correctly
predicts surprising, previously unobserved phenomena.
Where competing theories differentially satisfy the theoretical virtues, no
single theory is uniquely selected by the virtues. In such a situation, the vir-
tues are unable to determine choice of theory. How, then, is the choice to be
made? Assuming that a choice is to be made as to whether to accept a theory,
                                                   
7 I here summarize the naturalistic realist approach to the warrant of methodological
norms that I have developed in earlier work (see, e.g., Sankey 2000, 2002).
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it is necessary to decide which of the virtues is most significant in the par-
ticular context, and therefore which virtue or virtues is to be accorded the
greatest weight.8 Such a decision cannot be determined by the virtues them-
selves, since they are unranked. Hence, the scientist who makes the decision
must form a judgement in which they weigh up the competing virtues in order
to determine which virtue is to be accorded greatest importance. Such
judgement is an act or process of deliberation that requires the scientist to
make decisions about the relevance, importance, and comparative signifi-
cance of the different theoretical virtues. The worry, as we shall see in the
next section, is that such deliberative judgement may not be subject to objec-
tive constraint.
The need for scientists to exercise a capacity for deliberative judgement
arises, as we have just seen, from the failure of multiple theoretical virtues to
uniquely determine choice of theory. There is a further way to formulate the
problem, which trades on the possibility of underdetermination of theory by
data.
The problem arises as follows. Let us suppose that there may be empiri-
cally equivalent theories. That is, there may be theories that are equally sup-
ported by all of the available empirical data.9 On the assumption that there is
no readily available empirical evidence to decide the issue in the manner of a
crucial test, the choice between such theories may not be made on empirical
grounds. How, then, is the choice to be made? It can only be made on a non-
empirical basis. It is at this stage that appeal may be made to non-empirical
criteria such as simplicity, coherence, unity, or elegance. But, since theories
might exemplify the non-empirical virtues to varying degrees, and there is no
established rank-order of the non-empirical virtues, we arrive at a similar
position to that which arose due to the multiplicity of the virtues. Namely,
                                                   
8 Note that I do not assume that a choice must necessarily be made as to which theory
to accept. It is possible to suspend judgement until further deciding evidence is available.
Also, as Laudan points out, there are different cognitive modalities that scientists may
adopt towards theories ranging from entertainment and pursuit at one extreme, to belief or
acceptance at another (Laudan 1977).
9 The form of underdetermination indicated here is a weak form of underdetermination
sometimes known as transient underdetermination. There are, of course, further forms of
underdetermination that may be distinguished. For example, there is the purportedly
strong form of underdetermination, which involves underdetermination of theory by all
possible evidence. There is also the so-called Duhem–Quine thesis, which turns on holistic
considerations, such that no empirical counter-instance constitutes a decisive refutation of
a theory, since a theory is always tested in conjunction with a range of auxiliary hypotheses
that may also be impugned by the negative outcome of a test. Distinctions between various
forms of underdetermination have no apparent bearing on the present point.
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scientists must make a judgement as to which non-empirical virtues are to be
accorded greatest weight. We have once again a situation in which a judge-
ment must be made due to lack of determination by the theoretical virtues.
There is a tendency, especially in the literature relating to the virtue-
theoretic reading of Duhem’s notion of good sense, to favour this second way
of framing the issue.10 However, I prefer the former way of presenting the
problem. It is conceptually simpler. It makes fewer assumptions. It requires
no assumptions about underdetermination and empirically equivalent theo-
ries that some may find questionable. In short, it carries less philosophical
baggage.
5. VIRTUOUS JUDGEMENT
In section 4, we have seen that, due to the multiplicity of virtues, a role
must be played by deliberative judgement in scientific theory-appraisal. A
judgement is required in order to determine the relevance, significance, and
relative importance to be accorded to the various theoretical virtues. Because
they are unranked, this is not something that can be read off the virtues
themselves. Instead, the scientist must exercise their own judgement in re-
flecting upon the range of virtues satisfied by competing theories. The deci-
sion to select one out of a field of competing theories is, therefore, based on
the scientist’s assessment of the comparative importance of the virtues pos-
sessed by the theories under consideration.
The role that judgement plays in theory-appraisal raises the prospect of
subjective elements entering into theory-choice. For, if the scientist’s judge-
ment is not determined by the theoretical virtues, the judgement itself appears
not to be subject to the constraint of objective criteria. Does this then mean that
anything goes? Is theory-choice simply a matter of subjective, personal taste
not open to critical scrutiny on the basis of independent standards?11
                                                   
10 No doubt, the reason for the emphasis on underdetermination has to do with the ho-
listic context in which Duhem appeals to the notion of good sense. As Abrol Fairweather
puts it, the “success condition for good sense is to break the empirical stalemate” (2012:
142). Against those who appeal to theoretical virtues as a way to determine choice between
empirically equivalent theories, Ivanova (2014) argues that the theoretical virtues fail to
determine such choice.
11 On Kuhn’s analysis of such choice, there is a subjective element that is not determined
by the values that he takes to provide the “shared basis of theory-choice” (1977: 322). But
he denies that the subjective element makes theory-choice a matter of inscrutable personal
taste. The scientist must be willing and able to explain the basis of their choice.
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It is at this juncture that the epistemic virtues described by virtue episte-
mology take on special relevance. I wish to suggest that the deliberative
judgement made by scientists in the context of theory-choice is subject to
objective constraint. The constraint is due to the epistemic virtues, which are,
as we have previously seen, properties of the scientists themselves rather
than properties of the theories that scientists appraise on the basis of the
theoretical virtues. In the context of theory-choice, the scientist must reflect
upon the manner in which competing theories satisfy the applicable theoreti-
cal virtues. The cognitive act of deliberating upon the relevance, significance,
and relative importance of the theoretical virtues when applied to the com-
peting theories may be informed and guided by the epistemic virtues of the
scientist. The judgement that the scientist arrives at in determining the supe-
riority of one of the competing theories is a judgement that may itself be a
virtuous one. The way in which the epistemic virtues enter into the scientist’s
judgement may itself provide a further objective basis for the scientist’s deci-
sion that is additional to that provided by the theoretical virtues themselves.
The scientist’s judgement is not unconstrained. It is subject to the objective
constraint provided by the epistemic virtues.
An impressive range of epistemic virtues has been identified.12 But one
of the most insightful discussions remains Stump’s virtue-theoretic analysis
of Duhem’s idea of good sense. Stump draws attention to what he describes as
Duhem’s “image of the scientist as impartial judge” (2007: 151). In the ap-
praisal of competing theories, as well as in the resulting choice of theory, the
scientist is in effect cast in a role like that of a judge making a decision in re-
lation to a legal matter. In order to fulfill that arbitrative role in an appropriate
manner, it is necessary for the scientist to adopt an attitude of detached neu-
trality with respect to personal interests and theoretical commitments. In
appropriately performing the role of impartial judge, the scientist behaves
in a virtuous way. The virtue involved in performing as an impartial judge is
not just a virtue that is cognitive in nature. It has a moral dimension as well.
In addition, the virtuous exercise of good sense employs a capacity to arrive
at a reasoned decision in the absence of clear-cut rules that might determine
the outcome of the decision.
The key elements required of the scientist as judge may be found in the fol-
lowing passage from Duhem’s book, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory:
                                                   
12 In their summary of the literature on the topic, Paternotte and Ivanova provide a list
of virtues that have been identified by commentators: open-mindedness, intellectual courage,
intellectual sobriety, intellectual humility, faithfulness, integrity, disinterestedness, honesty,
and impartiality (2017: 1791-1792). They also discuss the role played by intellectual vices in
the history of science. I will have nothing to say here about the vices.
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nothing contributes more to entangle good sense and to disturb its insight than pas-
sions and interests. Therefore, nothing will delay the decision which should determine
a fortunate reform in a physical theory more than the vanity which makes a physicist
too indulgent towards his own system and too severe toward the system of another. We
are thus led to the conclusion so clearly expressed by Claude Bernard: The sound ex-
perimental criticism of a hypothesis is subordinated to certain moral conditions; in or-
der to estimate correctly the agreement of a physical theory with the facts, it is not
enough to be a good mathematician and skillful experimenter; one must also be an im-
partial and faithful judge. (Duhem 1954: 218)
For Duhem, a scientist’s “passions and interests” may undermine and detract
from good sense. They may dispose the scientist to the “vanity” of being “too
indulgent” towards their own theory while being “too severe” toward theories
held by others. Rather than succumb to “passions and interests,” and fall prey
to such “vanity,” the scientist must act as an “impartial and faithful judge.”
The primary virtue involved here is the virtue of impartiality. In exercising
the virtue of impartiality, the scientist forms a judgement in a neutral and
detached manner. They do not unduly or unfairly take sides in relation to
competing theories. Their judgement is not biased in favour of a preferred
theory. With regard to the problem raised by the multiplicity of theoretical
virtues, a key role played by impartiality is to ensure that relevant theoretical
virtues are recognized and correctly applied. Where a theory is supported by
empirical evidence, the scientist as impartial judge recognizes the existence
of the evidence and accords it due weight. Where competing theories exem-
plify the same virtues to varying degrees, the impartial scientist recognizes
the respects in which the theories satisfy those virtues. If it is possible to
reach a decision based on these considerations, the impartial scientist arrives
at a judicious determination of which theory is to be favoured on balance, if
one theory is indeed to be favoured on balance.
Duhem’s idea of the scientist as impartial judge provides an example of how
an epistemic virtue such as impartiality may enter into the process of delib-
erative judgement. Other epistemic virtues, such as open-mindedness or in-
tellectual honesty, may also be involved in the process. My suggestion is that
appropriate activation of epistemic virtues contributes a further element to
the objectivity of the decision-making process. Their involvement in the
process serves to ensure that the theoretical virtues are rigorously and cor-
rectly applied. The scientist whose judgement is appropriately guided by the
epistemic virtues is one whose deliberations are honestly and conscientiously
conducted. Their judgement is based solely on appropriate considerations of
an epistemically relevant kind rather than being subject to the influence of
personal interest, political ideology, or other forms of bias. There is no guar-
antee, of course, that the outcome of the deliberation will be adoption of a
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true or even maximally warranted theory, since the judgement is a fallible
one. Nor is there any guarantee that all scientists will arrive at the same out-
come. It is simply a matter of ensuring that due weight is accorded to the
various applicable theoretical virtues, and that the decision is not subject to
the influence of inappropriate factors such as bias or personal interest. Such
virtuous judgement, I wish to suggest, contributes significantly to the objec-
tivity of the decision-making process.
6. THE PRIMACY OF THE THEORETICAL VIRTUES
We have now seen two sources for the epistemic objectivity of science. On
the one hand, provided that theoretical virtues reliably promote truth, rather
than merely being independent factors, they constitute a robust objective basis
for scientists’ adoption of theory. On the other hand, the epistemic virtues
exemplified by individual scientists insert an element of objectivity into the
judgement by means of which scientists determine the relevance and signifi-
cance of theoretical virtues.
What is the relationship between these two sources of objectivity? What I
wish to suggest is that the theoretical virtues possessed by theories are the
primary locus of epistemic objectivity. If a theory fails to satisfy relevant
theoretical virtues, or fails to satisfy the virtues as well as competitors, there
is simply no objective basis for acceptance of the theory. If, for example, a
theory is not supported by empirical evidence and fails to display such key
virtues as coherence, simplicity, or breadth, it is difficult to see on what basis
the theory might be accepted. It is, in short, a necessary condition for the ac-
ceptability of a theory that it satisfies relevant theoretical virtues. Indeed, it is
necessary that the theory satisfy the virtues to a greater extent than alterna-
tive theories that also satisfy the virtues.
Given the apparent primacy of the theoretical virtues, I suggest that the
epistemic virtues, which inform scientists’ judgement of the relevance and
significance of the theoretical virtues, must play a role that is secondary to
that of the theoretical virtues. Whereas the theoretical virtues govern the ob-
jective acceptability of a theory, the epistemic virtues determine whether an
individual scientist’s application of those virtues has an objective basis. But, if
the theoretical virtues play a primary role with respect to the epistemic ob-
jectivity of science, one might very well wonder whether there is any need for
the epistemic virtues of individual scientists in the first place. Given that the
theoretical virtues provide an objective basis for scientific theory-acceptance,
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what difference does it make whether an individual scientist’s judgement is
appropriately guided by the epistemic virtues?
Here an important lesson may be gleaned from the literature on process
reliabilism. In order to show that a role must be played in theory-appraisal by
the epistemic virtues, I wish to make a point that is analogous to the point
made by Keith Lehrer in his example of Mr. Truetemp (Lehrer 1990: 163-164).
Lehrer describes the case of Mr. Truetemp, who has, unbeknownst to himself,
a device called a Tempucomp that has been surgically implanted in his head.
The device is a highly accurate thermometer that interacts computationally
with Truetemp’s brain in a very specific way. Whatever the temperature in
fact is, the Tempucomp makes Truetemp consciously hold the belief that that
is what the temperature is. If the temperature is 40° Celsius, Truetemp be-
lieves that it is 40° Celsius. If it is 20° Celsius, Truetemp believes that it is 20°
Celsius. In other words, the process whereby the Tempucomp produces tem-
perature beliefs in the mind of Truetemp is a reliable belief-forming process.
In fact, it is a perfectly reliable process. As such, for the process reliabilist,
Truetemp’s reliably formed true temperature beliefs must surely constitute
justified beliefs about the temperature. Indeed, given that the beliefs are both
true and justified, they must constitute knowledge about the temperature.
But Truetemp has no awareness whatsoever of the basis of his temperature
beliefs. Worse, as a side-effect of the surgery in which the Tempucomp was
implanted, Truetemp does not even reflect upon the fact that he has these
beliefs or upon whether they are true or reliably formed. Truetemp is, as
Lehrer says, “only slightly puzzled about why he thinks so obsessively about
the temperature” (1990: 163-164).
The standard reaction to the Truetemp case is that there is something
lacking in relation to Truetemp’s beliefs about the temperature. Truetemp
cannot know what the temperature is, or indeed have justified beliefs about
the temperature, if he is completely oblivious of the basis of said beliefs. For
Truetemp’s beliefs about the temperature either to be justified or to form
knowledge, he must at the very least be aware of the basis for the beliefs. The
fact that he has no awareness whatsoever of why he holds the beliefs under-
mines the reliabilist thought that Truetemp has justified beliefs about the
temperature that derive from the reliable belief-formation process produced
by the Tempucomp.13
                                                   
13 I here employ the Truetemp example as a way to illustrate the need to grant a role to
epistemic virtues in the context of theory-appraisal. But it is worth mentioning that examples
such as the Truetemp case constitute problems for process reliabilism that virtue-theoretic
approaches may be able to avoid. The Tempucomp-based belief-formation process can
hardly be deemed a virtuous one. Examples such as these are part of the reason that some
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An analogous thought, I suggest, applies to the case of the theoretical
virtues. Without going so far as to imagine a full-blown Truetemp case, let us
suppose that a scientist accepts a theory that maximally satisfies all relevant
theoretical virtues. But the scientist has no awareness of the fact that the
theory satisfies the virtues. Nor does the scientist reflect upon the fact that
the theory satisfies the virtues as the basis of their acceptance of the theory.
Surely, in a manner that is analogous to the Truetemp case, there is some-
thing fundamentally lacking in the scientist’s acceptance of the theory. The
theory itself may well have a high degree of epistemic warrant due to satis-
faction of the theoretical virtues. But the scientist’s acceptance of the theory
that satisfies those virtues has no basis whatsoever. The scientist must, at the
very least, be aware that the theory satisfies the theoretical virtues if they are
to be justified in the acceptance of the theory. Though there is an objective
basis for acceptance of the theory, in not being aware of that basis the scien-
tist’s own acceptance of the theory is without objective basis.
On the assumption that there is a close analogy between Lehrer’s
Truetemp case and the case of the scientist who accepts a warranted theory
without awareness of the basis of the warrant, we may suggest the following.
At the very least, a scientist must be aware of the theoretical virtues, of the
fact that a theory satisfies or fails to satisfy the virtues, must reflect upon the
virtues and the satisfaction of the virtues by the theory, and must decide
whether or not to accept the theory on the basis of the reflective considera-
tion of the extent to which the theory satisfies the virtues. Unless the scientist
engages in such reflection, there can be no sense in which the scientist’s ac-
ceptance of the theory that is warranted by the theoretical virtues has any ra-
tional, or, indeed, objective basis.
The Truetemp-style case enables us to see that a role must be played by a
scientist’s reflective awareness of the theoretical virtues in theory-appraisal
and choice. What I wish to suggest is that it is at this juncture in the decision-
making process that the epistemic virtues play a vital role. In determining
which theory best satisfies the relevant theoretical virtues, a scientist must
consider the extent to which alternative theories satisfy the theoretical vir-
tues. In the course of such consideration, the scientist must proceed in a way
that exemplifies the epistemic virtues. They must, for example, proceed in the
manner of Duhem’s impartial scientist-judge, setting aside personal interest
and granting due weight to the empirical and non-empirical virtues displayed
by the competing theories. The scientist whose conscientious reflection upon
                                                   
philosophers have come to favour virtue-theoretic approaches over earlier forms of process
reliabilism.
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the relevance and significance of the theoretical virtues leads them to a fair
and judicious assessment of the merits of the theories is one whose delibera-
tion is conducted in a way that is appropriately informed by the epistemic
virtues. The judgement that they reach on the basis of such conscientious ap-
plication of the theoretical virtues is a virtuous judgement. In this way, the
epistemic virtues contribute substantively to the objectivity of the decision-
making process.
While I maintain that the epistemic virtues contribute substantively to the
objectivity of theory-appraisal and choice, I wish nevertheless to suggest that
they play a secondary role to the theoretical virtues. The reason is that the ac-
ceptability or otherwise of a theory is governed by the theoretical virtues,
since it is their role to promote and deliver truth or approximate truth at the
level of theories. Given their role in the pursuit of truth, the theoretical virtues
play the primary role in establishing the epistemic objectivity of science. How-
ever, the theoretical virtues need to be rigorously and conscientiously ap-
plied. This is where exercise of the epistemic virtues is able to contribute sub-
stantively to the objectivity of science by ensuring that the theoretical virtues
are appropriately applied, and their significance is fairly assessed. But, while
the epistemic virtues therefore play a vital role in the deliberative process,
their role is subordinate to that of the theoretical virtues. For without the
theoretical virtues, there would be no basis for acceptance of a theory in the
first place. It is the theoretical virtues that determine the quality of the theory.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have explored the relationship between theoretical and
epistemic virtues with respect to the epistemic objectivity of science. I have
argued that the theoretical virtues possessed by theories are the primary locus
of the epistemic objectivity of science. Because the theoretical virtues are not
merely independent factors, but genuinely truth-conducive tools of inquiry,
they provide scientists with an objective basis for theory-acceptance that is
robust rather than minimal in character. The epistemic virtues which indi-
vidual scientists possess, and which may inform their deliberations relating
to the application of the theoretical virtues, play a role that is subordinate to
that of the theoretical virtues with respect to the objectivity of science. Never-
theless, the epistemic virtues contribute substantively to the epistemic objec-
tivity of science, since they promote the rigorous application of the theoretical
virtues.
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I have not entered into the question of which form of virtue epistemology
most adequately captures the objective elements of science. That is a question
for future work. What I hope to have shown is that the epistemic virtues of
individual scientists may serve to enhance the robust objective basis for theory
acceptance that is provided by the theoretical virtues. Nor have I entered into
the question of the social aspects of scientific objectivity. It seems clear that
there are a number of ways in which collaborative aspects of scientific inquiry
may contribute to the objectivity provided by the exercise of the epistemic
virtues. That, too, must wait for future work.
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